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A question that has preoccupied sociolegal scholars for ages
is whether law can change ‘hearts and minds’. This article
explores whether non-discrimination law can create social
change, and, more particularly, whether it can change atti-
tudes and beliefs as well as external behaviour. The first part
examines how sociolegal scholars have theorised about the
possibility and desirability of using law as an instrument of
social change. The second part discusses the findings of
empirical research on the social working of various types of
non-discrimination law. What conclusions can be drawn
about the ability of non-discrimination law to create social
change? What factors influence this ability? And can non-
discrimination law change people’s hearts and minds as well
as their behaviour? The research literature does not provide
an unequivocal answer to the latter question. However, the
overall picture emerging from the sociolegal literature is that
law is generally more likely to bring about changes in exter-
nal behaviour and that it can influence attitudes and beliefs
only indirectly, by altering the situations in which attitudes
and opinions are formed.
Keywords: law and society, social change, discrimination,
non-discrimination law, positive action
1 Introduction
Can law change ‘hearts and minds’, and can it change
attitudes and beliefs as well as external behaviour? This
question, often in tandem with the question of whether
law should attempt do so, has preoccupied sociolegal
scholars for ages, and it is also a central question in this
article. The article examines, first, how sociolegal schol-
ars have theorised and written about the strengths and
limitations of law in general in creating (different types
of) social change. Second, it focuses on the ability of
non-discrimination law to create social change. What
have been the findings of empirical research on the
effects of (different types of) non-discrimination law?
When and under what circumstances and conditions can
it create (what types of) social change?
The article does not aim to provide a complete or sys-
tematic overview of the literature. The first part is based
predominantly on a survey of introductions to the disci-
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pline of law and society, nearly all of which devote a
chapter to the relationship between legal change and
social change or the use of law as an instrument of social
change. Laws and legal rules aimed at eliminating
discrimination or promoting equality are typical exam-
ples of law being used as an instrument of social change.
The second part of the article is based on a survey of
empirical sociolegal studies of the effects of non-discri-
mination law. I searched not only for studies evaluating
(from a top-down perspective) the effectiveness of, or
compliance with, specific laws or legal rules or rulings,
but also, or rather, for studies shedding light (from a
bottom-up perspective) on the social working of non-
discrimination law, i.e. its effects on the shop floor of
social life, where it is just one factor among others.
A shortcoming of the literature I reviewed for the first
part of the article is that it tends to use the concept of
social change in a rather loose manner. An explicit defi-
nition is often not provided.1 For the purpose of this
article, the discussion of the concept by Joel and Mary
Grossman, although somewhat older, is still useful. The
Grossmans distinguished three types or levels of social
change. The first level or type would consist of changes
in patterns of individual behaviour. The second level
would involve changes in group norms and/or changes
in the relations of individuals or groups to each other or
to the political, economic or social system. The third
type or level would consist of changes in a society’s basic
values or mores; the Grossmans note that this is ‘the
most difficult to describe and undoubtedly the most dif-
ficult to achieve’.2 The three levels are, of course, inter-
related and should be viewed on a continuum rather
than as discrete types. For the question of whether law
can change ‘hearts and minds’, the second and third
types of social change are most relevant. They are also
most difficult to identify, and it is even more difficult to
identify the role played by law in these processes.
Law’s impact on social change may be direct or indirect.
A direct impact occurs when law itself affects behaviour.
Changes in group norms and group relations and
changes in basic attitudes and beliefs are typically an
indirect or ‘ripple’ effect of legal change.3 The impact of
legal change on these types of social change can hardly
1. Cf. R. Cotterrell, The Sociology of Law: An Introduction (1993), at 47.
2. J.B. Grossman and M.H. Grossman, ‘Introduction’, in J.B. Grossman and
M.H. Grossman (eds.), Law and Change in Modern America (1971) 1,
at 6.
3. L. Friedman, Impact. How Law Affects Behavior (2016), at 48; S.E. Bar-
kan, Law and Society (2018), at 151.
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be measured, as law is just one factor among others that
play a role in such processes. Moreover, legal change is
often itself an effect of social change. There is often a
reciprocal relationship between legal and social change
in the sense that social forces or movements and social
change help to put in place new legislation that, in turn,
spurs further change.
As a final preliminary remark, although this article focu-
ses on the role that law can play in creating social change
and promoting equality, it should be recognised that
throughout history there have been more examples of
law being used to maintain the status quo. Law, as many
introductions to the sociology of law point out, has a
tendency towards conservatism:
Once a scheme of rights and duties has been created
by a legal system, continuous revisions and disrup-
tions of the system are generally avoided in the inter-
ests of predictability and continuity.4
Moreover, certain kinds of discrimination are inherent
in law itself: ‘The law in its majestic equality … forbids
the rich as well as the poor from sleeping under bridges,
begging in the streets, and stealing bread.’5
2 Theorising on the Relation
between Law and Social
Change
This section examines how sociolegal scholars have the-
orised about law’s ability to bring about social change.
Over the last two centuries, views on the relationship
between law and social change have changed. The pre-
vailing view has long been that law merely reflects the
sense of justice and the current mores and opinions of
the population; rather than an independent force acting
on society, law was seen as an aspect of society. This
started to change in the late eighteenth century, a period
of rapid social change in Europe. Jeremy Bentham
(1748-1832), English philosopher and jurist, and one of
the founders of utilitarianism, advocated that legal
reforms should respond quickly to new social needs.
However, he also held that ‘legislation has the same cen-
tre with morals, but not the same circumference’,6
meaning that law and morality have a common goal,
namely to regulate people’s behaviour in such a way as
to produce the greatest possible sum of good, but differ
in their extent:
[T]here are many acts useful to the community which
legislation ought not to command. There are also
4. S. Vago, Law and Society (2012), at 21-2.
5. D. Black, The Behavior of Law (1989), at 72.
6. J. Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation
(1907) (first printed 1780), at 60.
many injurious actions which it ought not to forbid,
although morality does so.7
One reason for this difference is, according to Bentham,
that legal duties and offences must be defined in a very
clear and precise manner, which is simply not possible
for many moral duties or vices.8
In the early twentieth century, the prevailing view on
the relationship between law and society still held that
legal change could not have an impact unless it con-
formed to prevailing trends in social mores and norms.
In his classic work Folkways, American sociologist Wil-
liam Graham Sumner (1840-1910) posited that ‘legisla-
tion cannot make mores’ (often misquoted as ‘stateways
cannot change folkways’).9 Sumner wrote, among other
topics, about race relations in southern US society,
pointing out that after the civil war, the whites had not
been ‘converted from the old mores’, and that attempts
to control the new order by legislation had been vain.10
Sumner did not claim that it is absolutely impossible to
induce a change in mores or customs, but he empha-
sised that legislation alone would not restrain people
from doing what they have always believed to be right or
appropriate or make them do something they have
always thought wrong or unwise. Lawmakers should
therefore estimate the probable support for proposed
changes and the amount of enforcement power probably
required.11
In the course of the twentieth century, law, and espe-
cially legislation, came to be seen as separate from the
society it regulates, and it came to be used as an instru-
ment for social engineering in ways these earlier writers
could not have imagined.12 This development is mir-
rored in twentieth-century sociolegal writing. Argu-
ments against the possibility and desirability of using
law to induce social change were, as Yehezkel Dror put
it, ‘overruled by the facts of reality’, and the growing
use of law as an instrument of social change came to be
seen as a characteristic of modern society that required
intensive study.13 Many twentieth-century sociolegal
scholars reflected on the advantages and limitations of
law as an instrument of social change. Most of them,
however, avoided making generalised statements about
the role of law in social change.14
Section 2.1 provides an overview of what contemporary
law and society scholars regard as strengths and limita-
tions of law as an instrument of social change. Section
7. Ibid., at 60.
8. Ibid., at 60-1.
9. W.G. Sumner, Folkways: A Study of the Sociological Importance of
Usages, Manners, Customs, Mores, and Morals (1960) (first printed
1907), at 81.
10. Ibid., at 81.
11. H.V. Ball, G.E. Simpson & K. Ikeda, ‘Law and Social Change: Sumner
Reconsidered’, 67 American Journal of Sociology 532, at 538 (1962).
12. Cf. Cotterrell, above n. 1, at 44-6; S. Vago and S.E. Barkan, Law and
Society (2018), at 208-10.
13. Y. Dror, ‘Law and Social Change’, 33 Tulane Law Review 787, at 796
(1958-1959).
14. Cf. J. Morison, ‘How to Change Things with Rules’, in S. Livingstone
and J. Morison (eds.), Law, Society and Change (1990) 5.
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2.2 takes a brief look at attempts to specify factors and
conditions maximising the impact of legal change. Sec-
tion 2.3 examines John Griffits’ attempt to develop a
systematic sociological theory of the social impact of
law.
2.1 Strengths and Limitations of Law as an
Instrument of Social Change
Most sociolegal scholars would agree that there are a few
important advantages of law in creating social change.15
The first is the binding force of law. Particularly in par-
liamentary democracies, people tend to consider law as
something that should be obeyed. An important factor is
the belief in legitimate authority, or, as Lawrence Fried-
man put it:
People obey the law, ‘because it is the law.’ … If they
were forced to explain why, they might refer to some
concept of democracy, or the rule of law, or some
other popular theory sustaining the political system.16
Steven Vago regarded the socialisation process as an
important factor in the binding force of law: ‘People, in
general, are brought up to obey the law. The legal way
of life becomes the habitual way of life.’ Moreover, as
this habitual way of life ‘requires less personal effort
than any other and caters well to a sense of security … it
also pays to follow the law’.17
Another advantage of law as an instrument of social
change is that ‘it is backed by mechanisms of enforce-
ment and sanctions’.18 Alternatively, as Friedman put it,
Law has its hidden persuaders – its moral basis, its
legitimacy – but in the last analysis it has force, too,
to back it up.… This is the fist inside its velvet
glove.19
Some people may obey the law merely to avoid punish-
ment. However, most sociolegal scholars would proba-
bly agree with Tom Tyler’s assessment that people, in
general, obey the law not primarily because they believe
they will be punished for disobedience but because ‘they
believe it is proper to do so’.20
Other scholars pointed to law’s ability to shape bargain-
ing and dispute handling processes outside the courts,
in everyday social life. Parties in a dispute ‘do not bar-
gain in a vacuum …. They bargain in the shadow of the
law’. The outcome that the law will impose if no agree-
ment is reached casts its shadow over private negotia-
15. See, e.g., Vago, above n. 4, at 319 ff.
16. L. Friedman, The Legal System: A Social Science Perspective (1975), at
114.
17. Vago, above n. 4, at 323.
18. Ibid., at 320.
19. L.M. Friedman and G.M. Hayden, American Law: An Introduction
(2017), at 263-4.
20. T. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (1990); T. Tyler, ‘Multiculturalism
and the Willingness of Citizens to Defer to Law and to Legal Authori-
ties’, 25 Law & Social Inquiry 983, at 984 (2000).
tions; it gives the parties in a dispute certain ‘bargaining
endowments’.21
Because of these strengths, and particularly because of
law’s legitimate authority, social movements may see lit-
igation as an effective tool in helping advance their aims.
Steven Barkan emphasised the indirect benefits of legal
mobilisation:
[Even if it] does not produce significant tangible
results in and of itself, it may still give aggrieved
groups a sense of legal entitlement by suggesting that
their claims and grievances are in fact their legal
rights. This sense may in turn give them new hope
for social and political change and spur members of
these groups to work for such change.22
Law thus offers important advantages as an instrument
of social change. However, the lists of limitations that
can be found in introductions to the field of sociology of
law are much longer.
Some limitations are inherent in the law itself. First, as
was already argued by Sumner, legislation cannot
enforce itself. In an article entitled The Limits of Effec-
tive Legal Action, Roscoe Pound pointed out that a stat-
utory rule (unlike common-law rules) is made a priori
and is not necessarily a ‘living rule’ when it is laid down.
Statutory rules cannot enforce themselves:
Human beings must execute them, and there must be
some motive setting the individual in motion to do
this above and beyond the abstract content of the rule
and its conformity to an ideal justice or an ideal of
social interest.23
Pound concluded that lawmakers must therefore study
how to ensure that people will have a motive for mobi-
lising the law ‘in the face of the opposing interests of
others in infringing it’.24 A second limitation, which was
already mentioned by Bentham, is that if laws are to be
applied and enforced by courts or other legal actors, a
high degree of clarity must be sought. Pound therefore
held that law, unlike morals, can only be used to control
external, observable behaviour. He gave as an example
that law cannot protect against purely subjective mental
suffering because of ‘obvious difficulties of proof’.25
Other limitations originate from a variety of forces that
directly or indirectly may reduce law’s ability to create
change. Steven Vago distinguished between social, psy-
21. R.H. Mnookin and L. Kornhauser, ’Bargaining in the Shadow of the
Law: The Case of Divorce’, 88 Yale Law Journal 950, at 968 (1979). It
should not be assumed, however, that disputes are always transformed
into the language of the law; in many disputes, people may choose
between several different types of norms. See H. Jacob, ‘The Elusive
Shadow of the Law’, 26 Law & Society Review 565 (1992).
22. Barkan, above n. 3, at 160.
23. R. Pound, ‘The Limits of Effective Legal Action’, 3 American Bar Associ-
ation Journal 55, at 69 (1917); see also Cotterrell, above n. 1, at 51 ff.;
M. Berger, Equality by Statute: The Revolution in Civil Rights (1968),
at 219.
24. Pound, ibid., at 70.
25. Ibid., at 66.
23
Anita Böcker doi: 10.5553/ELR.000148 - ELR July 2020 | No. 3
chological, cultural and economic factors. Social factors
include vested interests:
The acceptance of almost any change through law
will adversely affect the status of some individuals or
groups in society, and to the degree that those whose
status is threatened consciously recognize the danger,
they will oppose the change.26
Habit is a psychological factor that may act as a barrier
to change: ‘Once a particular form of behavior becomes
routinized and habitual, it will resist change.’27 Cultural
factors include ethnocentrism: ‘[F]eelings of superiority
by whites have hindered integration efforts in housing,
employment and education among many areas in the
context of race relations.’28 Last but not least, economic
factors may form a barrier to changes that might
otherwise be readily adopted. Vago gives as an example
that the administrative costs associated with affirmative
action programmes in the United States were resisted in
many academic circles and contributed to demands for
modification of a variety of laws affecting higher educa-
tion.29
Law’s ability to create social change also depends on the
type of change sought. Yehezkel Dror distinguished
between ‘emotionally neutral’ and ‘expressive and eval-
uative’ areas of activity, arguing that the latter are far
more resistant to changes imposed by law. Dror referred
to studies of the reception of western European law in
Turkey, which showed that
aspects of social action of a mainly instrumental char-
acter, such as commercial activities, were significant-
ly influenced by new law, while those aspects of social
action involving expressive activities and basic beliefs
and institutions, such as family life and marriage hab-
its, were very little changed despite explicit laws try-
ing to shape them.30
Other authors likewise argued that law is ‘generally
more likely to bring about changes in what may be
called external behavior’.31 According to some, the use
of law to change deep-rooted attitudes and beliefs by
imposing legal duties that require such changes is
fraught with problems. Legal sanctions are useless and
may even have perverse effects.32 Allott refers to the
notion of ‘superficial conformism’. People who feel that
their opinions are contradictory to the ‘official and gen-
eral line of thought’ will keep these opinions to them-
selves and conform in their outward response to what
they think is the permitted line.33
26. Vago, above n. 4, at 331.
27. Ibid., at 333.
28. Ibid., at 335.
29. Ibid., at 336.
30. Dror, above n. 13, at 800.
31. Vago, above n. 4, at 329.
32. See, e.g., Cotterrell, above n. 1, at 54; M. Wood, ‘EC 1992: Free Mar-
ket Framework or Grand Design’, in S. Livingstone and J. Morison
(eds.), Law, Society and Change (1990) 185.
33. A.N. Allott, The Limits of Law (1980), at 231.
A few authors are more optimistic about law’s ability to
change basic attitudes and beliefs.34 According to Vago,
‘changes in external behavior are, after a while, usually
followed by changes in values, morals, and attitudes’.35
Friedman refers to experimental studies that showed
that people tend to change their minds about moral
propositions when they find out what ‘the law’ has to
say.36 Thus, it would seem that the law’s ‘legitimate
authority’ can wield influence over attitudes as well as
behaviour. Of course, this presupposes that people are
aware of what the law says – which in practice is often
not the case.37
Even optimistic authors assume that law can influence
attitudes and beliefs only indirectly. According to
Friedman, the impact of legal change is ‘mediated and
influenced by some sort of learning process – a compli-
cated process – that takes place within society’.38 Wil-
liam M. Evan assumed that legal change may produce
changes in attitudes and beliefs through two interrelated
processes: a process of institutionalisation (the establish-
ment of a norm with provisions for its enforcement) and
a process of internalisation (the incorporation of the val-
ue(s) implicit in the law). ‘Law … can affect behavior
directly only through the process of institutionalization;
if, however, the institutionalization process is success-
ful, it, in turn, facilitates the internalization of attitudes
or beliefs.’39
2.2 Attempts at Specifying Conditions That
Maximise the Impact of New Laws
Various scholars have tried to specify the conditions
under which a new law is likely to effectively influence
behaviour and, perhaps, attitudes. Evan, writing with
the US experience with law and racial desegregation in
mind, hypothesised that seven conditions are necessary
for law ‘to perform an educational function’ – condi-
tions that, he stressed, are not always possible to
achieve:
1. The source of the new law should be perceived as
authoritative.
2. The rationale for the new law should clarify its con-
tinuity and compatibility with existing institutional-
ised values.
3. Publicity surrounding the new law should empha-
sise that similar laws have proven helpful in other
countries or settings.
4. The enforcement of the law must be aimed at mak-
ing the change in a relatively short time, so as to
minimise the chances of the growth of organised or
unorganised resistance.
34. For a more extensive overview, see A. Kok, ‘Is Law Able to Transform
Society’, 127 South African Law Journal 59, at 71 ff. (2010).
35. Vago, above n. 4, at 329.
36. Friedman (1975), above n. 16, at 115.
37. Friedman (2016), above n. 3, at 14.
38. Ibid., at 72.
39. W.M. Evan, ‘Law as an Instrument of Social Change’, in A.W. Gouldner
and S.M. Miller (eds.), Applied Sociology: Opportunities and Problems
(1965) 285, at 286.
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5. The enforcement agents must themselves be com-
mitted to the behaviour required by the law, even if
not to the values implicit in it.
6. Positive as well as negative sanctions should be used
to help ensure compliance.
7. Effective protection and resources should be pro-
vided for people who would suffer from evasion or
violation of the law by other people.40
Similar listings, mostly based on common sense and
inductive reasoning on the basis of a few specific cases,
were drawn up by other scholars.41 Although a wealth of
empirical studies on law’s impact on behaviour have
been undertaken in the half-century since Evan wrote
his still often-cited essay, a recent review concludes that
it is hardly possible to draw general conclusions about
the conditions under which new laws are most likely to
have an impact: ‘Much more research is needed. More
replications. More attempts at pulling the strands
together. Otherwise, everything depends. On time. On
place. On situation.’42 Friedman’s synthesis study nev-
ertheless shows that the potential for legal impact is
greater when four factors coincide: ample publicity, a
proper mix of rewards and punishments, peer pressure
supporting obedience to the new law, the new law
appealing to the sense of conscience and prevailing
moral views of the public at which it is aimed.
40. Ibid., at 285.
41. See J.A. Kok, A Socio-Legal Analysis of the Promotion of Equality and
Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 (2008); Kok (2010),
above n. 34. Kok made a detailed analysis of four of these requirements
of effective laws in his study of the potential effectiveness of a South
African non-discrimination law.
42. Friedman (2016), above n. 3, at 249.
2.3 Griffiths’ Theory of the Social Working of
Law
An attempt to develop a systematic sociological theory
of the social impact of law was made by John Griffiths.
Griffiths was motivated by puzzlement:
It is hard to understand how anyone could ever
expect a legislated rule to have any effect on behavior.
After all, as it leaves the legislative body a law seems
to be nothing more than so many ink marks on
paper.43
Griffiths called his theory ‘the social working approach’
and set it against traditional ‘instrumentalist’ approaches
to legislation. According to Griffiths, lawmakers and
authors of impact studies tend to make four untenable
assumptions about society and social life and the place
therein of legal rules.44 Griffiths’ theory of the social
working of legal rules consists of four propositions that
are simply the opposite of the basic assumptions of the
instrumentalist paradigm:
Griffiths’ depiction of the instrumentalist paradigm in
legal impact studies is slightly caricatural. Moreover,
there are many examples of sociolegal studies that do
take a sociological approach. However, there have not
been many attempts at developing a systematic theory of
the relationship between legal and social change, and an
important merit of Griffiths’ social working approach is
that it forces researchers to look ‘bottom-up’, not ‘top-
down’. It is not the intention of the lawmaker, but the
43. J. Griffiths, ‘The Social Working of Legal Rules’, 48 Journal of Legal Plu-
ralism 1, at 4 (2003).
44. Ibid., at 16.
Instrumentalist approaches Social working approach
Atomistic individualism: Society is seen as made up of individuals
who behave like rational actors, bound together by the state
organisation and not by anything else.
People are fundamentally social beings: Legal rules are addressed
to social beings acting in a specific social context, not to asocial
rational actors seeking to maximise their preferences.
Perfect legal knowledge: The social space between the state and
the individual is conceived of as a normative vacuum through
which the commands of the legislature pass unmediated and
untransformed by intervening social rules and structures on their
way to the individual.
Legal knowledge is socially contingent: The message about the
law that ultimately comes to an actor’s attention is seldom the
same as what the legislature intended. The transmission process
is a transformation process in which the message gets simplified
and otherwise distorted and enriched with all sorts of additional
information.
Legal monism: The state is assumed to have an effective
monopoly over the regulation of interaction that (except in
some extremely deviant situations such as the mafia) excludes
other sources of regulation as important influences on behav-
iour.
Legal pluralism: The state is but one of many sources of regula-
tion, and for individuals engaged in social interaction, the behav-
ioural expectations of the state are frequently less well known,
less clear and less pressing than those of other sources of regula-
tion that are closer to the scene.
Legislative autonomy: The legislature is treated as external to
and independent of the social context in which legal rules are
effective.
Inseparability of legislation from social life: Legislation is an inte-
gral part of processes of ordering, conservation and change in
society; it is not a distinct and autonomous force acting on those
processes.
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‘shop floor of social life’, where law is only one factor
amidst other factors, that should be at centre stage.
This ‘shop floor of social life’ can be described and ana-
lysed as a ‘semi-autonomous social field’ (SASF). Sally
Falk Moore developed this concept in a classic article on
the relationship between law and social change.45 Every
society, Moore argued, consists of overlapping SASFs;
every individual belongs to various SASFs at any given
time. An SASF can generate rules and has the means to
induce or coerce compliance internally, but it is also
vulnerable to rules and decisions emanating from the
state and other SASFs. Examples of SASFs are families,
workplaces, churches or branches of industry. Accord-
ing to Moore, ‘the various processes that make internal-
ly generated rules effective are often also the immediate
forces that dictate the mode of compliance or non-com-
pliance to state-made legal rules’.46 Studying the opera-
tion of SASFs in which new legal rules have to unfold
their effects would thus enable researchers to gain a bet-
ter understanding of how legal change is really effected.
Griffiths’ approach was applied in several studies of the
social working of non-discrimination law, which will be
discussed next.47
3 Empirical Studies on the
Social Impact of Non-
discrimination Law
This section turns to the findings of empirical research
on the social impact of non-discrimination law. What
conclusions can be drawn from this literature about the
effects (or lack thereof) of non-discrimination law and
the factors that explain these effects?
Non-discrimination law comes in many forms and can
be used to promote equality and combat discrimination
in different (direct or indirect) ways. Legislation and
legal rules can be used to prohibit discrimination and
provide remedies for (individual) victims; to oblige or
encourage employers or other actors to take affirmative
action; or to open up institutions (e.g. marriage) for
groups that used to be barred from these institutions.
Moreover, non-discrimination law consists not only of
legislation but also of case law. In the United States, in
particular, social movements have used litigation to pur-
sue social change, and court decisions have played an
important role in bringing about policies and legislation
aimed at reducing racial and other discrimination.
45. S. Falk Moore, ‘Law and Social Change. The Semi-Autonomous Social
Field as an Appropriate Subject of Study’, 7 Law and Society Review
719 (1973).
46. Ibid., at 721.
47. J. Griffiths, ‘The Social Working of Anti-Discrimination Law’, in T. Loe-
nen and P. Rodriguez (eds.), Non-Discrimination Law: Comparative
Perspectives (1999) 313; T. Havinga, ‘The Effects and Limits of Anti-
Discrimination Law in The Netherlands’, 30 International Journal of the
Sociology of Law 75 (2002).
This section discusses findings from studies on each of
these types of non-discrimination law. Section 3.1 focu-
ses on legislation based on an ‘individual rights model’.
Section 3.2 focuses on affirmative action law. Both types
of non-discrimination law have been the subject of eval-
uation studies. However, rather than effectiveness or
compliance evaluations, I selected studies that shed light
on the social working of non-discrimination law, i.e. its
effects on the shop floor of social life, where it is just
one factor of many that influence behaviour. The next
three subsections contain examples of other types of
non-discrimination law. Section 3.3 examines the role of
civil society groups in making non-discrimination law a
reality on the ground. Section 3.4 examines how rules
and processes within social fields may resist or support
state-made non-discrimination rules. Section 3.5 discuss-
es the findings of studies that focused specifically on law’s
ability to eliminate or reduce prejudice.
3.1 Legislation Based on an ‘Individual Rights
Strategy’
Many non-discrimination laws are based on what has
been called an ‘individual rights strategy’48 or an ‘indi-
vidual justice model’.49 This type of legislation gives
individuals who belong to disadvantaged groups the
right to equal treatment. To uphold this right, an indi-
vidual has to take action. He or she can ask the offend-
ing party to comply with the law, and, should this claim
be unsuccessful, file a complaint with a specialised agen-
cy or bring the case to court. The enforcement thus
depends primarily on the action of individual victims of
discrimination.
Various empirical studies have shown the limitations of
this type of legislation. A first limitation is that claims
and complaints tend to be limited to overt and direct
forms of discrimination. For example, in the Nether-
lands, in the early years of the gender equality legisla-
tion, many complaints concerned job advertisements
stating a preference for, or excluding, male or female
applicants. One will hardly find such advertisements
any more today. Legislation prohibiting discrimination
may thus be effective against overt forms of discrimi-
nation. However, other (more covert, indirect or sys-
temic) forms of discrimination, if unlawful at all, are
practically impossible to recognise for individual vic-
tims.
Other limitations arise because victims who do recognise
that they have been or are being discriminated, often
prefer the options of ‘lumping it’, ‘avoidance’ or ‘exit’,
rather than confront the offending party and invoke the
protective measures of law. In a classic study, based on
in-depth interviews with women (black, Hispanic and
white) and men (black and American Indian) in the
48. S. Macaulay, ‘Lawyers and Consumer Protection Laws’, 14 Law and
Society Review 115 (1979); Griffiths (1999), ibid.; Havinga, Ibid.
49. C. McCrudden, ‘International and European Norms Regarding National
Legal Remedies for Racial Inequality’, in S. Fredman (ed.), Discrimi-
nation and Human Rights: The Case of Racism (2001) 251. Other mod-
els distinguished by McCrudden are the ‘group justice model’ and
‘equality as participation’.
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United States who had experienced discrimination,
Kristin Bumiller highlighted three factors that make
victims of discrimination refrain from taking action and
mobilising the law:
– The power disparity between the parties involved
(for example, between an employee and her
employer).
– The refusal to consider oneself a victim. Discrimi-
nation is seen as inevitable in the lives of disadvan-
taged groups; they develop an ‘ethic of survival’.
– Victims’ perception of the law: law is on their side
(forbidding discrimination), but is it able to really
help them, or will legal intervention worsen the
situation?50
The same or similar barriers have been found in other
studies.51
Bumiller’s study built on a large survey, in which thou-
sands of randomly selected respondents were asked
what grievances they had experienced in the past three
years and how they had dealt with these grievances.52
The researchers distinguished five stages in the devel-
opment of a dispute from grievance to court filing: 1)
grievance; 2) claim (the aggrieved party confronts the
offending party and asks for redress); 3) dispute (the
offending party rejects the claim); 4) the aggrieved party
contacts a lawyer; 5) court filing. Only a small fraction
of all grievances in their study reached the last stage.
However, the pattern for discrimination grievances (one
in seven respondents reported grievances involving
racial, sexual, age, or other discrimination in employ-
ment, education or housing) clearly differed from the
general pattern: grievances were less likely to lead to
claims; claims were more likely to be rejected; and dis-
putes were less likely to lead to contacts with lawyers
and court filings. ‘The impression is one of perceived
rights which are rarely fully asserted. When they are,
they are strongly resisted and pursued without much
assistance from lawyers or courts.’53 Findings such as
these illustrate the limitations of an individual rights
strategy in legislating against discrimination.
Griffiths’ social working theory was applied in a study
of the effects and limits of the Dutch 1994 Equal Treat-
ment Act, which prohibited discrimination on grounds
of religion, belief, political opinion, race, sex, nationali-
ty, heterosexual or homosexual orientation and civil sta-
tus in the areas of employment and goods and services
50. K. Bumiller, ‘Victims in the Shadow of the Law: A Critique of the Model
of Legal Protection’, 12 Signs 421 (1987).
51. E.g., B. Quinn, ‘The Paradox of Complaining: Law, Humor, and Harass-
ment in the Everyday Work World’, 25 Law & Social Inquiry 1151
(2000); J. Verstraete, D. Vermeir, D. De Decker & B. Hubeau, Een
Vlaams antidiscriminatiebeleid op de private huurmarkt. De mogelijke
rol van zelfregulering (2017); see also Kok (2008), above n. 41, at
12-13: “Many South Africans have internalised discrimination and do
not perceive discriminatory incidents perpetrated against them as discri-
mination, but as “the way things are”…. The majority of South Africans
lack confidence in the courts and the justice system and have inade-
quate access to courts.”
52. R.E. Miller and A. Sarat, ‘Grievances, Claims, and Disputes: Assessing
the Adversary Culture’, 15 Law & Society Review 525 (1980).
53. Ibid., at 545.
provision. Tetty Havinga examined five factors or con-
ditions that might play a role in the social working of
legislation based on an individual justice model:
– Whether a specialised agency has been set up to
investigate complaints, what (other) competences it
has and how it uses these competences. The study
found that the Equal Treatment Commission at the
time took a reactive rather than a proactive
approach, investigating complaints and handing
down rulings but not using its competences to ini-
tiate investigations or to enforce compliance with its
rulings in court. This was due to resource limita-
tions, but partly also to the commission’s preference
for giving priority to its judicial tasks; at any rate it
meant that the mobilisation of the law depended
largely on members of the protected groups and
civil society organisations.
– Whether knowledge about the legal rules is commu-
nicated to potential offenders and potential victims.
The study showed that five years after its entry into
force, most actors at ‘the shop floor of social life’
had only a vague idea about the contents of the
Equal Treatment Act.
– Whether there are civil society organisations that
inform, activate and support members of the pro-
tected groups in claiming their right to equal treat-
ment. The study showed that especially in cases
concerning racial discrimination, specialised (non-
discrimination) NGOs played an important role.
– Whether expert legal assistance is available for vic-
tims of discrimination. The study found that in
cases concerning racial discrimination, legal assist-
ance was mostly provided by the aforementioned
specialised NGOs. Possible explanations could be
the lack of competent lawyers, the relatively low
monetary stakes and the expectations of victims of
racial discrimination.
– Whether the social fields in which the legal norms
are supposed to work tend to support or oppose the
legal norms. The study found that there was more
support (at least ideologically) within public sector
organisations as compared with private firms, and
within larger as compared with smaller firms.54
3.2 Affirmative Action Legislation
Griffiths hypothesised that ‘more is often to be expected
from regulatory approaches that do not depend on the
creation of individual rights that require mobilization
and enforcement on the shop floor’.55 Equal employ-
ment opportunity (or employment equity) laws are
based on a ‘non-individual rights’ approach. This type
of legislation obliges employers to engage in proactive
employment practices to improve the employment
opportunities of members of under-represented groups
(e.g. women, racial minorities, persons with disabilities).
Particularly in the United States, affirmative action laws
54. Havinga (2002), above n. 47.
55. Griffiths (1999), above n. 47, at 10.
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have also been used to fight discrimination in the areas
of education and housing.
An obvious strength of this strategy is that its effective-
ness does not have to depend on actions of individual
members of disadvantaged groups. It may thus be better
suited to combating indirect and systemic forms of
discrimination. However, a potential risk is that (some)
members of majority groups perceive ‘affirmative’ or
‘positive action’ as a threat to their position. They may
thus be provoked to resistance:
Few workplace policies are as controversial or divi-
sive as affirmative action programs. They attempt to
redress or reduce historical forms of discrimination
based on demographic distinctions among employees,
but they simultaneously mandate social categoriza-
tions on the basis of those same distinctions.56
Critics claim that affirmative action laws and policies
stigmatise minority students or employees as being less
than fully qualified, when in fact they may be well
qualified. Another, related potential weakness is that
affirmative action relies and depends on the collection
and processing of data regarding membership of the
designated groups. Employment equity laws require
employers to collect, maintain and report information
about how racial minorities, women and/or persons
with disabilities are represented across occupational cat-
egories and salary levels within their workforce. They
are required to identify areas of under-representation
and to set goals for improvement by comparing the
information about their own workforce to data on the
availability of racial minorities, women and/or people
with disabilities in relevant labour markets. The effec-
tiveness of affirmative action thus depends on the quali-
ty and accuracy of both types of data.
Various studies have evaluated the effects of employ-
ment equity laws in Canada and the Netherlands,
among other countries. Studies of the impact of Cana-
da’s federal employment equity legislation found that it
did make a difference for the representation rates of the
designated groups, though more so for those of women
and visible minorities than for those of aboriginal people
and persons with disabilities. Moreover, progress dif-
fered across sectors and occupations.57 Carol Agocs
examined two contrasting explanations for the limited
results. The first was that the legislation itself was
flawed. An essential weakness would be its reliance on
data collected through self-identification. Increases in
the representation of, in particular, aboriginal people
and persons with disabilities might be partly attributable
to changes in the rates of self-identification. However,
Agocs found it more likely that the limited results stem-
56. D.A. Harrison, D.A., Kravitz, D.M. Mayer, L.M. Leslie & D. Lev-Arey,
‘Understanding Attitudes Toward Affirmative Action Programs in
Employment: Summary and Meta-Analysis of 35 Years of Research’, 91
Journal of Applied Psychology 1013, at 2013 (2006).
57. C. Agocs, ‘Canada’s Employment Equity Legislation and Policy,
1987-2000: The Gap between Policy and Practice’, 23 International
Journal of Manpower 256 (2006); C. Agocs (ed.), Employment Equity
in Canada. The Legacy of the Abella Report (2014).
med ‘from a failure of employers to implement the Act,
and of government to enforce it and hold employers
accountable for lack of compliance’.58 This gap between
policy and practice might in turn be explained by the
lack of political will to provide adequate provisions for
monitoring and enforcing compliance. For example,
employers covered by the Employment Equity Act were
subject to compliance audits by the Canadian Human
Rights Commission, but the Act forbade the commis-
sion to impose quotas on employers even when they
were not in compliance. Enforcement by the commis-
sion was also hampered by resource limitations.
Employers with more than 100 employees were required
to implement employment equity as a condition for bid-
ding on contracts with the federal government, but the
review process appeared to be extremely lenient. In
addition, Agocs pointed to ongoing structural changes
in the labour market and the nature of work:
Employment equity policy assumes long-term jobs
with somewhat specialized job descriptions, not the
‘flexible’ and contingent jobs favored by many
employers today, or the very small businesses or self-
employment arrangements that are becoming com-
mon, particularly among women.59
Trends such as these might worsen the position of the
designated groups in the labour market, and the current
employment equity legislation was not likely to address
them effectively.
The Netherlands had employment equity legislation in
place in the years 1994-2004. The objective of the
Dutch Employment Equity Act (Wet Bevordering
Evenredige Arbeidsdeelname Allochtonen) was to
improve the position of ethnic minorities in the labour
market. The Dutch law was modelled on the Canadian
legislation. However, it did not rely on data based on
self-identification but on ‘objective’ data, i.e. infor-
mation on the country of birth of one’s parents. A study
of the drafting stage and the first five years of the legis-
lation found that there was a lot of resistance against the
collection and registration of these data, most fiercely
from employers (because of the administrative burden)
but also from employees and others (who had principal
objections to the registration of data on people’s race or
ethnicity).60 Moreover, the study found that the Dutch
law’s approach was weakened by political compromises
even more than was the case with its Canadian counter-
part. The drafters of the law did not attach meaningful
sanctions to non-compliance with the requirements
imposed by the law. Publicity was expected to be an
effective measure to achieve compliance. Employers
were obliged to deposit annual reports with the Cham-
58. Agocs (2006), ibid., at 270.
59. Ibid., at 274.
60. P. Jonkers, Diskwalificatie van wetgeving. De totstandkoming en uit-
voering van de Wet Bevordering Evenredige Arbeidsdeelname Alloch-
tonen (Wbeaa) (2003); A.P. Jonkers and P.E. Minderhoud, ‘The Dutch
Employment Equity Act: An Analysis from the “Poldermodel” Perspec-
tive’, in F. van Loon and K. van Aeken (eds.), 60 maal recht en 1 maal
wijn. Liber Amicorum prof. dr. Jean van Houtte (1999) 530.
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bers of Commerce, and third parties had a right of
access to these reports. However, many employers did
not comply and got away without any repercussions.61
The representation rates of the designated groups nev-
ertheless improved during the years the legislation was
in force. The favourable economic situation probably
helped a lot in achieving these results.
Studies on the implementation of affirmative action leg-
islation in the United States have likewise shown the
importance of enforcement of requirements. Executive
Order 11246 requires firms that do business with the
federal government to take affirmative action to ensure
that job applicants are employed and that employees are
treated during employment without regard to their race,
colour, religion, sex or national origin. A study of its
effects concluded that during the initial years, when this
affirmative action requirement was vigorously enforced,
the representation rates of black men and women
increased significantly faster in contractor than in non-
contractor firms. However, this progress stopped in the
1980s, when enforcement budgets and staff were
reduced.62 Another American study, on affirmative
action programmes for minority students, found evid-
ence that affirmative action programmes can stigmatise
minority students. However, the researchers concluded
that this finding ‘tells us less about the inherent weak-
ness of affirmative action than about the poor fashion in
which programs are carried out’.63 Referring to social
psychological studies, they suggested that the power of
negative stereotypes can be defused through pro-
grammes of ‘wise intervention’. Such programmes
should, among other elements, provide ‘an emphasis on
challenge rather than remediation in learning, conveying
to students their potential for growth rather than their
accumulated deficiencies’, and ‘affirmation of minority
students’ belonging on the campus and their routine
acceptance as members of the scholarly community’.64
The picture emerging from these and other studies on
the impact of affirmative action laws and policies is
mixed. However, a clear conclusion is that their effects
and effectiveness depend to a large extent on how they
are implemented and enforced and, moreover, on how
the purposes behind the requirements are communica-
ted to all actors involved.
3.3 Mobilisation of the Law (and the Protected
Groups) by Civil Society Groups
The importance of the involvement of civil society in
making non-discrimination law a reality on the ground
has been underlined most clearly in studies of the
American civil rights movement. Charles Epp argued
that ‘rights are not gifts’; they ‘originate in pressure
61. Jonkers, ibid.
62. J.S. Leonard, ‘The Impact of Affirmative Action Regulation and Equal
Employment Law on Black Employment’, 4 Journal of Economic Per-
spectives 47 (1990).
63. C.Z. Charles, M.J. Fischer, M.A. Mooney & D.S. Massey, ‘Affirmative
Action Programs for Minority Students: Right in Theory, Wrong in Prac-
tice’, 55 Chronicle of Higher Education 29 (2009), https://
www.chronicle.com/article/Affirmative-Action-Programs/35122.
64. Charles et al., ibid.
from below in civil society, not leadership from above’.65
Epp attributed the growth in civil rights cases decided
by the US Supreme Court to the emergence of groups
such as the National Association for the Advancement
of Colored People and the American Civil Liberties
Union:
Only certain kinds of pressure from below,
particularly organized support for rights litigation,
are likely to support sustained judicial attention to
civil liberties and civil rights; and support from judi-
cial elites is hardly irrelevant.66
In a study of the impact of the US Supreme Court’s
decision in Brown v. Board of Education, which outlawed
segregation in public schools, Gerald N. Rosenberg also
emphasised the pivotal role of the civil rights move-
ment. According to Rosenberg, even if the court had not
acted as it did, ‘the existence and strength of pro-civil-
rights forces at least suggests that change would have
occurred, albeit at a pace unknown’.67
The same factor, i.e. the involvement of civil society
groups, was found to be of crucial importance in making
Swedish non-discrimination legislation work. Reza
Banakar compared two Swedish non-discrimination
laws: the Equality between Women and Men Act
(EWMA) and the Act against Ethnic Discrimination
(AED). They were comparable in many respects; in
fact, the AED was modelled on the EWMA. However,
the AED was much less mobilised and applied than the
EWMA. Banakar found that this could not be explained
by differences between the two laws or how they were
enforced by ombudsmen. His explanation was that the
two laws
constitute two different forms of legislation, the one
emerging from below as a result of an ongoing rights
discourse and acting bottom up, the other being
imposed from above to introduce a rights discourse
and acting top down.68
The women’s movement was actively involved in both
the making of the EWMA and its enforcement once it
had entered into force. The AED lacked such a support
structure. It was enacted by the Swedish government in
response to international pressure to satisfy the legal
standards set by various UN and ILO conventions. The
groups it aimed to protect were diffuse and barely
organised; they were hardly involved in the making of
the law and did not have the organisational capacities to
mobilise it once it was in force.
65. C.R. Epp, The Rights Revolution. Lawyers, Activists, and Supreme
Courts in Comparative Perspective (1998), at 197.
66. Epp, ibid., at 197.
67. G.N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social
Change? (1991), at 157.
68. R. Banakar, ‘When Do Rights Matter? A Case Study of the Right to
Equal Treatment in Sweden’, in S. Halliday and P. Schmitt (eds.),
Human Rights Brought Home. Socio-Legal Perspectives on Human
Rights in the National Context (2004) 165, at 184.
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The aforementioned study of the Dutch Employment
Equity Act came to a similar conclusion. Unlike its
Canadian counterpart, the Dutch law was introduced
through political pressure from above, not through
pressure from below. The drafters of the law expected
that organisations of the designated groups would
actively mobilise the law once it was in place, but they
did not. Trade unions and works councils were also very
hesitant to help enforce the law, because they lacked
resources and, moreover, did not want to harm their
relations with employers.69
The role of civil society organisations has also been
examined in studies on the implementation and/or
mobilisation of European equality law in EU member
states. Anna van der Vleuten examined how European
gender equality law was implemented in more and less
willing member states. Her study shows that unwilling
member states can be forced to comply when they are
put under pressure (‘squeezed’ or ‘sandwiched’) by
supranational and domestic actors simultaneously.70
Constanza Hermanin sought to explain why, fifteen
years after its entry into force, the European Racial
Equality Directive was very rarely used to claim racial
discrimination at the Court of Justice of the European
Union (CJEU). Her analysis of jurisprudence of nation-
al courts in three member states showed that the
absence of CJEU case law was related to scarce litigation
for fighting racial and ethnic discrimination at the
national level. This scarcity of domestic litigation was,
in turn, related to the limited presence, organisational
capacities and keenness and capacity to engage in legal
strategies of specialised civil society organisations.71
These and other studies72 illustrate that civil society
groups can play a crucial role in making non-discrimi-
nation law a reality on the ground. Non-discrimination
laws may be enacted without their involvement, but the
chances of ‘law in the books’ becoming ‘law in action’
are higher when they are involved in the lawmaking
process and perceive the law as ‘theirs’ once it is in
force. The mobilisation of non-discrimination rights
often depends on whether there are NGOs that can
inform, activate and support members of the protected
groups. The enforcement of affirmative action require-
ments sometimes likewise depends on the actions of
civil society organisations.
69. Jonkers, above n.60, at 123 ff.
70. A. van der Vleuten, ‘Pincers and Prestige: Explaining the Implementa-
tion of EU Gender Equality Legislation’, 3 Comparative European Poli-
tics 464 (2005).
71. C. Hermanin, ‘Whither Judicial Europeanization? The Case of the Race
Equality Directive’, in B. Witte, J. Mayoral, U. Jaremba, M. Wind & K.
Podstawa (eds.), National Courts and European Law: New Issues, Theo-
ries and Methods (2016) 239.
72. E.g., A. Böcker, ‘Racial Discrimination in The Netherlands’, 17 New
Community 603 (1991); N. O’Brien, ‘Social Rights and Civil Society:
“Giving Force” without ‘Enforcement’, 34 Journal of Social Welfare
and Family Law 459 (2012).
3.4 Support or Resistance within Relevant Social
Fields
Non-discrimination law has to unfold its effects at the
shop floor of social life, in what may be considered
SASFs.73 Social fields have their own, internally gener-
ated rules, norms and routines, and the means of induc-
ing or coercing compliance. These internal rules and
processes may hamper or promote compliance with
rules emanating from the state. State-made non-discri-
mination rules may be supported and incorporated into
the prevailing norms and structures, but they are more
likely to be resisted, at least initially.
Studies on the civil rights movement in the United
States have shown that the Supreme Court’s 1954 deci-
sion in Brown v. Board of Education met with fierce
resistance in the southern United States. Rosenberg’s
study of the impact of this federal court ruling led him
to conclude that ‘while there is little evidence that
Brown helped produce positive change, there is some
evidence that it hardened resistance to civil rights
among both elites and the white public’.74 Resistance to
change grew not only in education, but also in other
areas. Rosenberg posited that the courts offer only a
‘hollow hope’ for achieving social change. Victories in
court may not prompt much change, as the opposing
parties often fiercely resist these changes, and the courts
lack effective enforcement powers. According to Rosen-
berg, ‘Brown’s major positive impact was limited to rein-
forcing the belief in a legal strategy for change of those
already committed to it.’75 However, other authors
emphasised the importance of this indirect benefit of
legal mobilisation. Although Brown did not quickly end
school segregation, it did give African Americans in the
southern United States new hope and helped spur the
massive civil rights protests that captured the nation’s
attention in the following decade.76 A study on women’s
struggles for pay equity yielded a similar conclusion.
Michael McCann found that the actual gains fell short
of the high hopes created by the movement’s legal victo-
ries; employers’ resistance effectively limited pay equity
achievements. But women gained a new sense of their
rights as workers and their discrimination as women
workers; this encouraged them to become more active in
labour unions and to press for reforms in areas beyond
pay equity.77 Another study showed that although it did
not end discrimination, the Americans with Disabilities
Act helped to improve the self-image and to enhance the
career aspirations of people with disabilities.78
Resistance to change may also take a passive or covert
form. Studies of the social impact of the Dutch 1994
Equal Treatment Act found that, in general, the norm
of equal treatment enjoyed a high degree of support in
73. See Section 2.3 above.
74. Rosenberg, above n. 67, at 155; see also Barkan, above n. 3, at 158.
75. Rosenberg, above n. 67, at 156.
76. Berger, above n. 23; Barkan, above n. 3, at 157 ff.
77. M. McCann, Rights at Work. Pay Equity Reform and the Politics of
Legal Mobilization (1994); Barkan, above n. 3, at 160.
78. D.M. Engel and F.W. Munger, Rights of Inclusion: Law and Identity in
the Life Stories of Americans with Disabilities (2003).
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the social fields targeted by the law. However, members
of these social fields tended to assume that their work
practices and routines were in accordance with the law,
without really knowing (or asking) what the law
required in specific situations. They simply believed
that discrimination did not occur in their organisation or
industry. The researchers noted, however, that some of
the selection criteria and procedures used by, for
example, banks or insurance companies, might very well
constitute indirect discrimination under the law.79 A
recent study of discrimination in the rental housing
market in the Netherlands showed that these findings
were still valid. Landlords and rental brokers were not
aware that some of their usual practices might be in
breach of the non-discrimination legislation. In their
everyday practice, discrimination was not really an
issue; they were much more preoccupied with issues
such as the risk of tenants growing drugs in their prop-
erties.80
Various other factors and characteristics of social fields
may influence compliance with non-discrimination law.
One such factor is whether the ‘definition of the situ-
ation’ of the lawmakers is shared within the relevant
social fields. In the case of the Dutch Employment
Equity Law, employers did not believe that discrimi-
nation was an important factor in the disadvantaged
position of ethnic minorities in the labour market. This
certainly did not help to gain their support and compli-
ance.81 Other factors are the anticipated costs of compli-
ance and whether the areas of activity concerned are of a
mainly instrumental character or of an expressive and
evaluative character.82 These factors may explain why
large employers were found to be more likely to adapt
their employment policies and procedures to comply
with the Dutch Equal Treatment Act than small
employers.83
However, such modifications may represent cosmetic
rather than deep changes. In this regard, it is interesting
that in the United States one effect of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act was that large employers created internal
procedures for resolving discrimination complaints, as
an alternative to formal legal channels. A study in which
complaints handlers were interviewed showed that, on
the one hand, such internal procedures encouraged the
resolution of many complaints that would find no reme-
dy under law. In this sense, law could be said to cast a
broad shadow over the internal dispute resolution pro-
79. T. Havinga, ‘Aanbieders van goederen en diensten en gelijke-behande-
lingswetgeving’, in I.P. Asscher-Vonk and C.A. Groenendijk (eds.),
Gelijke behandeling: Regels en realiteit. Een juridische en rechtssocio-
logische analyse van de gelijke-behandelingswetgeving (1999) 371;
T. Havinga and C.A. Groenendijk, ‘De sociale werking van gelijke-
behandelingswetgeving’, in I.P. Asscher-Vonk and C.A. Groenendijk
(eds.), Gelijke behandeling: Regels en realiteit. Een juridische en
rechtssociologische analyse van de gelijke-behandelingswetgeving
(1999) 495, at 508; Havinga (2002), above n. 47, at 86.
80. A. Böcker, A. Terlouw & E. Özdemir, Discriminatie bij de verhuur van
woningen? Een verkennend onderzoek naar verklaringen en de moge-
lijke aanpak (2019).
81. Jonkers, above n. 60.
82. See Section 2.1 above.
83. Havinga (2002), above n. 47.
cess. At the same time, however, the shadow of law was
eclipsed by organisational concerns. Law was found to
play a very peripheral role in the complaint handlers’
orientations toward discrimination complaints. They
were focused on resolving complaints to restore smooth
employment relations and tended to recast discrimi-
nation claims as typical managerial problems. Lauren
Edelman concluded that ‘[w]hile the assimilation of law
into the management realm may extend the reach of law,
it may also undermine legal rights by deemphasizing
and depoliticizing workplace discrimination’.84
In a later study, Edelman argued that an important rea-
son for the limited success of equal employment oppor-
tunity law is that employers create policies and pro-
grammes such as non-discrimination policies, anti-har-
assment policies, diversity programs ‘that promise equal
opportunity yet often maintain practices that perpetuate
the advantages of whites and males’,85 and that even
courts defer to these symbolic structures:
The widespread acceptance of organizational policies
that symbolize equal opportunity … extends into the
legal realm, where courts too often focus on the pres-
ence of organizational policies that signify nondiscri-
mination more than they attend to evidence that
minorities and women face systematic disadvantages
at work.86
These research findings are in line with the basic
assumptions of Griffiths’ social working approach, in
particular the assumption of the socially contingent
character of legal knowledge (state-made rules are medi-
ated and transformed by intervening social rules and
structures on their way to members of SASFs) and the
assumption of legal pluralism (state-made rules often
have to compete with the internal rules of social fields,
and the latter rules may be clearer and more binding for
the members of these social fields).
3.5 Can Non-discrimination Law Change
People’s Hearts and Minds?
A few studies have focused specifically on the question
of whether non-discrimination law can eliminate or
reduce prejudice. They tend to assume that it can do so
only indirectly.
American studies mostly refer to the example of deseg-
regation (in the army, schools, housing projects) to
argue that changes required by law have lessened preju-
dice by altering the situations in which attitudes are
formed or reinforced. As Morroe Berger put it in his
study on the role of law in the area of civil rights:
[L]aw does not change attitudes directly, but … by
altering the situations in which attitudes and opinions
are formed, law can indirectly reach the more private
84. L.B. Edelman, H.S. Erlanger & J. Lande, ‘Internal Dispute Resolution:
The Transformation of Civil Rights in the Workplace’, 27 Law & Society
Review 497, at 497 (1993).
85. L.B. Edelman, Working Law: Courts, Corporations, and Symbolic Civil
Rights (2016), at 14.
86. Ibid., at 15.
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areas of life it cannot touch directly in a democratic
society.87
Berger cited Gordon Allport’s contact hypothesis,
which holds that interpersonal contact can reduce preju-
dice. It is important to note, however, that Allport him-
self emphasised that only under certain conditions
would interpersonal contact reduce prejudice:
Prejudice … may be reduced by equal status contact
between majority and minority groups in the pursuit
of common goals. The effect is greatly enhanced if
this contact is sanctioned by institutional supports
…, and provided it is of a sort that leads to the per-
ception of common interests and common humanity
between members of the two groups.88
These facilitating conditions (equal status, common
goals, intergroup cooperation and institutional support)
may well be managed in experiments. Experimental
research has indeed yielded evidence that externally
imposed desegregation can reduce prejudice over time.
The authors of a recent study presented their findings
as a refutation of Sumner’s contention that legislation
cannot change mores.89 Unfortunately, however, the
conditions outlined by Allport are much more difficult
to meet in real social life. Prospects are most favourable
in the area of education.
Another psychological mechanism is the cognitive dis-
sonance mechanism. Robert L. Kidder referred to this
mechanism to explain the decline in expressions of racial
prejudice and hatred found in surveys in the southern
United States after the Supreme Court’s 1954 school
desegregation decision:
[P]eople cannot persist in behaving in ways that are
incompatible with their beliefs and values.… If the
law prevents people from acting consistently with old
beliefs and values, then they abandon the old beliefs
and adopt new ones which fit the actions they find
themselves doing.90
However, he questioned the reliability and validity of
the surveys’ results.
A recent American study has found that legalising same-
sex marriage has accelerated the acceptance of homosex-
uality.91 The researchers examined each US state’s level
of bias against gay people before and after the legalisa-
tion of same-sex marriage in that state. They found that,
although bias against gay people was already on the
87. Berger, above n. 23, at 217, 229.
88. G.W. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (1954), at 281.
89. A. Eller, D. Abrams & M. Koschate, ‘Can Stateways Change Folkways?
Longitudinal Tests of the Interactive Effects of Intergroup Contact and
Categorization on Prejudice’, 72 Journal of Experimental Social Psy-
chology 21 (2017).
90. R.L. Kidder, Connecting Law and Society. An Introduction to Research
and Theory (1983), at 119.
91. E.K. Ofosu, M.K. Chambers & E. Hehman, ‘Same-Sex Marriage Legali-
zation Associated with Reduced Implicit and Explicit Antigay Bias’, 116
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 8846 (2019).
decline, it began to drop more quickly after the legalisa-
tion of same-sex marriage. This finding suggests that
legal change, the symbolic message of law, can sway
public opinion, improving tolerance for members of
stigmatised groups. However, there was some evidence
of a backlash in states that only legalised same-sex mar-
riage following federal legalisation. The researchers
therefore added the caveat that ‘[f]or laws to change
minds, it is possible that the laws must be perceived as
intrinsically motivated by the people’.92 A similar study
was conducted in Europe. Like its US counterpart, it
found that the legal recognition of same-sex relation-
ships was associated with an increase in favourable atti-
tudes towards sexual minorities. The effects were wide-
spread across demographic groups. The researchers
concluded: ‘Our results suggest that laws can exert a
powerful influence on societal attitudes.’93
Kidder would probably not share this optimism. As
said, he questioned the reliability and validity of surveys
that measured a decline in racist attitudes in the years
after the US Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v.
Board of Education. Kidder argued that there were other
changes, for example in the composition of the southern
population, which might explain the measured change
in attitudes. Moreover, people might just have learnt to
conceal racist attitudes when answering survey ques-
tions.94 Last but not least, Kidder pointed out that even
a genuine shift in people’s attitudes towards racial
minorities may not put an end to institutionalised rac-
ism. Referring to the example of school desegregation in
the United States, he argued that regardless of
[w]hether whites care or not for minority groups and
racial equality … their pursuit of economic security
and the best housing they can afford produces pat-
terns of residential segregation which are reflected in
school populations.95
This also raises the question of what is more important,
changes in (patterns of) behaviour or changes in atti-
tudes and beliefs? It can be argued that, overall, disad-
vantaged groups will benefit first of all from changes in
‘external’ behaviour; they will benefit most when they
are no longer confronted with practices of discrimination
in major areas of life.
4 Concluding Remarks
There is no unequivocal answer to the question of
whether law can change ‘hearts and minds’. The overall
picture emerging from the sociolegal literature is that
92. J.M. Chen, ‘When Laws Change Minds’, Psychology Today, 23 April
2019, https://www.psychologytoday.com/ie/blog/race-in-new-world/
201904/when-laws-change-minds (last visited 28 February 2020).
93. C.G. Aksoy, C.S. Carpenter, R. De Haas & K. Tran, ‘Do Laws Shape
Attitudes? Evidence from Same-Sex Relationship Recognition Policies in
Europe’, EBRD Working Paper 2018:219.
94. Kidder, above n. 90, at 125.
95. Ibid., at 125-6.
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law can do so only indirectly, by changing the situations
in which attitudes and beliefs are formed.
The research literature on the social impact of non-
discrimination law shows that its effects and effective-
ness depend largely on how it is implemented and
enforced, whether there are civil society groups that
help to enforce it and whether the social fields in which
it has to unfold its effects support it. Conditions for
achieving compliance are not always favourable.
Enforcement by governmental agencies is often ham-
pered by resource limitations, and civil society organisa-
tions may not be keen on and capable of mobilising the
law against more powerful parties. The norm of equal
treatment is widely supported in principle, but in every-
day social practice it has to compete with other, more
established rules, routines and practices within social
fields.
On a more positive note, the research literature also
confirms the notion of reciprocity between legal change
and social change. This implies that if the timing is
right, legal interventions may reinforce and accelerate
changes in social norms. As Griffiths put it,
[As] long as the legislator does not march too far in
advance of developments in social norms, legislation
can help to articulate them, thus making the applica-
ble norms clear and indisputable, at which point
informal control can assume the task of enforce-
ment.96
To put it in one sentence, law alone cannot deal effec-
tively with social problems such as discrimination, but it
can be an important ally or instrument for social change.
96. Griffiths (1999), above n. 47, at 323.
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